The Anglophone Africa Civil Society and Communities
CCM Shadow Report and Scorecard Initiative

THE TANZANIA MAINLAND CIVIL SOCIETY AND COMMUNITIES
CCM SHADOW REPORT

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“Africa’s story has been written by others; we need to own our problems and solutions and write our story”. - President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, 2013.*

*Every one of the Country Reports were done using Participatory Action Research: the research was developed, conducted, analysed and written by in-country national civil society activists.
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# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAI</td>
<td>AIDS Accountability International</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Country Co-ordinating Mechanism</td>
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<td>CoI/CI</td>
<td>Conflict of Interest</td>
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<td>CG</td>
<td>Community group</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
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<td>EANASO</td>
<td>Eastern Africa National Networks of AIDS Service Organisations</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Eligibility Performance Assessment</td>
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<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith-Based Organisation</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>WSW</td>
<td>Women who have Sex with Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>GF/GFATM</td>
<td>Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDU</td>
<td>Injecting drug users</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>KAP</td>
<td>Key Affected Populations</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Key Populations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDR TB</td>
<td>Multi-Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>MSM</td>
<td>Men who have sex with men</td>
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<td>NFM</td>
<td>New funding model</td>
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<td>NCM</td>
<td>National Coordinating Mechanism</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NPO</td>
<td>Non-Profit Organisation</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of the Inspector-General</td>
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<td>PAM</td>
<td>People Affected by Malaria</td>
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<td>PATB</td>
<td>People Affected by Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>Performance Improvement Plan</td>
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<td>PLWD</td>
<td>People Living with the Diseases of HIV, TB and malaria</td>
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<td>PLWHIV</td>
<td>People Living with HIV</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Primary Recipient</td>
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<td>RFA</td>
<td>Request for Application</td>
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<td>SR</td>
<td>Subsidiary Recipient</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Sub-Subsidiary Recipient</td>
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<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Sex Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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Problem Statement

Effective Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) are a vital part of the Global Fund architecture at country level. CCMs are responsible for submitting requests for funding and for providing oversight during implementation. With the introduction of the Global Fund’s New Funding Model (NFM) in March 2014, CCMs play an even more important central role, convene stakeholders to engage meaningfully in inclusive country dialogue, agree on funding split, and participate in the development of National Strategic Plan (NSP) discussions for the three diseases at country level.

With the enhanced responsibility, the NFM also introduced more rigorous CCM assessment processes. Previously, CCMs submitted a self-assessment attached to their proposal. Now, CCM self-assessments are facilitated by conducted by an external consultant – either the International HIV/AIDS Alliance or Grant Management Solutions for and on behalf of the CCM Hub. Further, CCMs are also mandated to have a performance improvement plan to accompany their assessment, ensuring that areas of weakness are addressed in an open and transparent manner.

Despite the importance of CCMs in Global Fund decision-making at country level, studies have flagged issues with CCM membership balance, poor representation and limited constituency feedback.1,2 Further, the recent audit report from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found several persistent shortcomings with CCM performance:

- 10% of the 50 countries reviewed did not have the required oversight committee;
- More than half of the countries did not have specific information on roles, timelines, and budgets in their oversight plans, or they had oversight plans that were outdated;
- 62% of the CCMs were non-compliant with the requirement of seeking feedback from non CCM members and from people living with and/or affected with the disease;
- More than half of the 45 CCMs that have oversight bodies did not adequately discuss challenges with the PRs to identify problems and explore solutions;
- 58% of the CCMs had not shared oversight reports with country stakeholders and the Global Fund Secretariat in the previous six months; and
- 26% did not share the oversight reports with relevant stakeholders in a timely manner that could have ensured well-timed remedial action.

In light of the OIG CCM Audit, and the enhanced role of CCMs in country level disease governance in the Funding Model, there is a need for a wide range of stakeholders to be empowered to demand improved CCM performance. While the move to have an external consultant to facilitate the CCM Eligibility & Performance Assessments (EPA) and the development of Performance Improvement Plans (PIPs) to guide the subsequent strengthening of the CCM is an improvement, the fact that these EPAs and PIPs are not public is an obstacle to accountability.

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Vested stakeholders and communities must be able to use CCM assessments and improvement plans as accountability mechanisms to demand better performance.

Added to this is the fact that currently CCM Assessment & Performance Improvement Plans lack questions that speak to quality of performance such as meaningful engagement, use of documentation and information, etc.

Civil society needs to be further engaged with the CCM Assessment & Performance Improvement Plans in order to hold stakeholders accountable. Similarly, these same civil society watchdogs and affected communities must have the tools, knowledge and information they need to be able to measure the performance of the CCM members that represent them and to hold CCMs accountable.
About the research

The project comprises of two types of research:

The Country CCM Shadow Reports
These reports drill down into issues at country level and assess CCM performance from the perspectives of both CCM members as well as the perspective of other stakeholders such as principal recipients and sub recipients. The report is based on the GFATM CCM Audit Progress Assessment Tool but also include various other questions that are seen to be lacking in the existing audits by Geneva. The reason why the research is considered a shadow reporting exercise is that methodologically and in terms of content we are hoping to build and improve on the methods being used by Geneva at this time. Shadow reports are used to supplement and/or provide alternative information to that which was submitted in the original reports. In this work, our aim is the same: to supplement and/or provide alternative information to that found in the original CCM audits.

The Civil Society CCM Scorecard and Country CCM Shadow Reports will not duplicate the Global Fund supported Eligibility and Performance Assessments (EPAs). This is because whilst EPAs are consultant facilitated self-assessments of CCMs that are largely driven by the Global Fund to facilitate accountability using a top down approach; the Civil Society CCM Scorecard and Country CCM Shadow Reports will be undertaken by civil society in country, using a bottom up approach. In addition, the Civil Society CCM Scorecard and Country CCM Shadow Reports sought to interview both CCM members as well as implementing partners (principal recipients (PRs) and sub-recipients (SRs)) who interact with CCMs. The research for the Civil Society Scorecard and the Country CCM Shadow Reports was facilitated by civil society resident in country so the exercise could both empower civil society and sustain the culture of demanding accountability from CCMs in country and be replicated across other grant implementers.

The Civil Society CCM Scorecard
A comparative analysis that ranks the participating countries against each other in terms of their performance. Using the AAI Scorecard methodology, data from the Country CCM Shadow Reports is analyzed and countries are graded on their performance, as a means to uncover best and worst practice, who is ahead, who is falling behind, and other similarities and differences that might make for good entry points for advocacy.

Focus Countries
Nine countries participated in the research: Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

Expected Outcomes

Long term goal
More accountable CCMs.

Medium term objective
Increased transparency around CCM performance and improvement plans.

Short term aim
Empowered civil society and community groups who can do effective shadow reporting.
Methodology

The technical team (AAI and EANNASO) developed a questionnaire based on the Global Fund Eligibility and Performance Assessments (EPAs) questionnaire (called the Progress Assessment Tool). AAI almost exclusively uses Participatory Action research (PAR) for field research, a best practice in which community and country civil society partners co-developed the methodology, research tools, conducted the research and wrote the final reports and analysis.

Local civil society, who do not sit on the CCM and do not receive Global Fund money, were identified to do conduct the research at country level, including data collection and analysis. We selected 3 local watchdogs in each of the 9 countries for a total of 27 local watch dogs to be trained, mentored and supported to do the research. The training also equipped civil society with skills to enable them to engage with the CCM Secretariat to plan and schedule the interviews and FGDs. Civil society conducted interviews to collect data using a mix of questionnaire interviews and focused group discussions (FGD). Comprehensive questionnaires with open ended questions and FGD guides were provided to civil society; these allowed for probing and discussions whilst collecting data.

First, the core group of respondents from the CCM for the interview and focus group discussions were drawn from a cross section of CCM members representing the respective governments, faith based, civil society, private sector, key populations, people affected by the diseases, the bi lateral and multi-lateral partners and the CCM secretariat. Civil society conducting the research were expected to undertake a minimum of eight face to face interviews and conduct one focus group discussion of not less than six CCM members.

These interviews and a FGD collectively included all of the following sectors: government, faith based, civil society, private sector, key populations, people affected by the diseases, the bi lateral and multi-lateral partners and the CCM secretariat.

Secondly, civil society also conducted a FGD of 10-12 non CCM members mainly drawn from implementing government and civil society PRs and SRs. The second FGD enabled the research to get the perspectives of non CCM members who have interacted with the CCM. Key areas of discussion included:

- How they have benefitted from the oversight function of the CCM;
- How, when and the outcomes of the oversight field visit;
- If the oversight reports and outcomes are formally shared and published through the CCM website;
- Whether women and KPs are adequately represented on the CCM;
- If civil society members were elected/selected in an open and transparent manner;
- An understanding of the level of meaningful participation of KPs in CCM leadership;
- An understanding of the level of meaningful participation of KPs informal and ad hoc committees;
- The methods of soliciting KP input and then this feedback to the larger constituency;
- Conflict of Interest (COI) e.g. how grant implementers (SRs) who are also CCM members manage COI in CCM meetings etc.
One aim was to build the capacity of the local civil society watchdogs to engage with a variety of different research techniques and data gathering modalities, so the following will contribute to this objective:

- Civil society received training on FGDs at the workshop;
- Civil society completed hard copies of the questionnaires at country level and then also captured the data online into a survey monkey.
- Civil society developed their own 2-3 page analysis of each of the 2 FGDs, talking about key findings (estimate 5-8 findings) and recommending strategic entry points for advocacy (estimate 3-5)
- In addition to this, civil society wrote their own 5-8 page analysis of all of the data as they understood and interpreted it and submitted this to the technical team. This analysis formed the basis of all of the research they conducted, and informed the technical team’s analysis of the data.

Sub-grants were made to each of the local watchdogs to support their implementation of the shadow reporting. The content from the country data collectors, once entered into the survey monkey tool, was analysed by AAI, presented to EANNASO and country teams at a meeting in Kigali, Rwanda in February 2017, and feedback from this meeting and from email correspondence from country teams was included to develop the final reports.
CCM Performance

All CCMs are required to meet the following six requirements to be eligible for Global Fund financing:

1. A transparent and inclusive concept note development process;
2. An open and transparent Principal Recipient selection process;
3. Oversight planning and implementation;
4. Membership of affected communities on the CCM;
5. Processes for non-government CCM member selection; and
6. Management of conflict of interest on CCMs.

Below is a highlight of the research findings as per the above eligibility requirements:

**1. A transparent and inclusive concept note development process**

From this study, it has been founded that the TNCM adequately takes on this role of coordinating the development of concept note through a very transparent and documented process that engage a broad range of representatives from constituencies. As such, TNCM members have space to design relevant programs and activities to be included in the application. However, reflections on TNCM members’ meaningful participation and capacity create sceptics of whether they are fully engaged in the concept note development. This indicates high chances that few members do own and complete this mandate.

For instance, the current trending dispute around the implementation of KP interventions amongst representatives of CSO and government constituencies results into questions of whether same people participated in the concept note development. Also, from one-on-one interviews; one interviewee showed no understanding about concept note development and the rest of other five core functions of the CCM.

**2. An open and transparent Principal Recipient selection process**

The study reveals a massive disagreement on the selection of the Principal Recipient (PR). This is further to selection of the PR who was also a member of the TNCM before declaring conflict of interest at last minute. The process is described as unfair one for there was all indicative signs that the current PR (2015-2018)\(^3\) did lobby the process and influenced decision on that particular selection and later award.

“**PR and SR selection is not fair and not transparent. (To improve it they should) follow guidelines on PR selection process.”**

“**PR selection was not done in a transparent manner. PR is not a local organization.”**

\(^3\) Save the Children was selected the PR of the Global Fund regardless of being one of a member of the TNCM
3. Oversight planning and implementation:

The oversight committee is composed of six members from three constituencies.\(^4\) The committee has in place an annual oversight plan which it implements throughout the year. However, findings reveal that the implementation of that particular plan has been ineffective due to a number of factors including, inadequate budget, low commitment among members of the committee, vastness of grant interventions across the country and low technical capacity of members. The desk review further shows that Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) herein referred to as Tanzania National Coordinating Mechanism (TNCM) has no website hence making it difficult to share information transparently beyond TNCM members. Subsequently, it was difficult to access oversight documents such as oversight plan, Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) and Eligibility Performance Assessment report. Also, delays and irresponsiveness nature of the committee chairman who is the government official is another source of stress. In turn, this affects grant performance in many ways and other key functions of the committee. In addition, over 90% of responses from members and non-members of TNCM do not support the idea of having in place an oversight/regional coordinating mechanism instead they recommend for a comprehensive capacity strengthening of the existing CCMs at country level.

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**Question: Oversight: How would you rate the performance of the oversight body?**

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<td>Zambia</td>
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**“TNCM oversight is functional with a plan. The oversight team has membership from the KP and KAP representatives.”**

**“The TNCM has an oversight team that includes KP representatives and also the representatives of the PLWA. The full TNCM during meeting also provides advice to grants implementing partners and intervenes where there are experiencing challenges. The oversight team also has a work plan with scheduled oversight activities. The oversight team presents oversight report to full TNCM with recommendations for addressing emerging issues.”**

\(^4\) The oversight committee is composed of three government representatives, one KP representative, two representatives from CSOs and one representative from non-state actors.
4. Membership of affected communities on the CCM

The membership and participation of affected communities is generally good since the TNCM evidently shows the membership of people both living with and representing people living with HIV/AIDS and people affected and representing people affected by Tuberculosis and Malaria as well as KAPs.

However, it is important to reflect on the observed kind of representation, participation, capacity to argue and raise the agenda and their influence in decision making. Findings show a merely members’ presence at TNCM and does not demonstrate meaningful participation and equal influence in decision making.

A closer look as to why that is happening, most of the interviewees underline low capacity as a major cause. It is therefore clear that the quality of representatives in the TNCM do not meet standards with regard to core functions of the TNCM members.5

“Strengthen TNCM representative elections processes to ensure the elections are all inclusive and participation is by all interested persons across the country.”

“Most KPs representatives are vocal but not in a position to influence decisions.”

“Observer participate but they can’t influence because the government and development partners are very strong and will only agree to issues that speak to their interests.”

“Observers are encouraged to participate, but they don’t have powers to influence.”

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5. Processes for non-government CCM member selection

Members representing non-government constituencies are to be selected by their own constituencies based on documented and transparent election process. However, the mentioned level of transparency remains questionable due to a number of issues as they were raised by interviewees during one-on-one interviews and Focus Group Discussions. The announcement of the constituency representation is not widely circulated among the members of the specific constituency. And, few people who access the announcement are required to complete the application process in short notice of less than a week. Findings from last elections show that one constituency candidate was elected in her absence.

CSO Quality: What is the quality of civil society sector representation?

Ghana: 13% Totally unacceptable quality, 38% Unacceptable quality, 50% Acceptable quality
Kenya: 36% Totally unacceptable quality, 27% Unacceptable quality, 36% Acceptable quality
Malawi: 14% Totally unacceptable quality, 100% Unacceptable quality
Nigeria: 14% Totally unacceptable quality, 86% Unacceptable quality, 14% Acceptable quality
Rwanda: 43% Totally unacceptable quality, 14% Unacceptable quality, 43% Acceptable quality
Swaziland: 18% Totally unacceptable quality, 18% Unacceptable quality, 9% Acceptable quality
Tanzania: 13% Totally unacceptable quality, 14.29% Unacceptable quality, 55% Acceptable quality
Uganda: 17% Totally unacceptable quality, 50% Unacceptable quality, 33% Acceptable quality
Zambia: 50% Totally unacceptable quality, 38% Unacceptable quality, 13% Acceptable quality

3. Participate meaningfully?

Ghana: 88% Yes, 12% No
Kenya: 100% Yes
Malawi: 60% Yes, 40% No
Nigeria: 67% Yes, 33% No
Rwanda: 50% Yes, 50% No
Swaziland: 27% Yes, 73% No
Tanzania: 86% Yes, 14% No
Uganda: 100% Yes
Zambia: 88% Yes

4. Influence decisions?

Ghana: 63% Yes, 37% No, 10% I don’t know
Kenya: 100% Yes
Malawi: 50% Yes, 50% No
Nigeria: 57% Yes, 43% No
Rwanda: 50% Yes, 50% No
Swaziland: 13% Yes, 87% No
Tanzania: 50% Yes, 50% No
Uganda: 90% Yes, 10% No
Zambia: 25% Yes, 75% No

ABLE TO INFLUENCE DECISION MAKING
Importantly also from respondents is that representation at the TNCM suffers Dar es Salaam syndrome meaning that over 70% of representatives comes from capital city, Dar es Salaam. Consequently, there has been inadequate representation of people from upcountry across all constituencies. The PLHIV community is presented as one of fully compliant on equal and fair representation of both people from upcountry and Dar es Salaam. These imbalances are also reflected in constituency consultation whereby pre and post meetings have preferably engaged Dar es Salaam based people. Tracing the cause, respondents unveil that budget constraints have been a limitation of having a very inclusive, engaging and equal representation. In response, it is recommended that budget for constituency consultation is increased for improved engagement and participants of all people across the country.

“Through elections guided by set criteria and facilitated by an external independent consultant. There was limited participation by a wider CSO constituency, especially from those outside Dar es Salaam.”

“Elections were conducted and interested people participated in the elections. But elections were not made public and not every interested candidate was aware.”

6. Management of conflict of interest on CCMs

All members of the TNCM claim to have fulfilled the requirement of signing conflict of interest consent. This is always completed immediately after orientation to newly elected members of TNCM from their respective constituencies. However, from interview responses, it is evident that the conflict of interest is persistent especially for matters or decisions which conflict between government and non-governmental constituencies.

Question: Are there any conflicts of interest in the CCM?

![Conflict of Interest Analysis Table]

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>All the time</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Sometimes/Occasionally</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>I don't know</th>
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<tr>
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<td>25%</td>
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In this respect, the government representatives including the chairperson intentionally fail to honour the conflict of interest policy instead favours the government.

The respondents also highlighted on other form of conflict of interest which becomes vivid when the TNCM member submits a request for application for the Global Fund grant as Principal Recipient (PR). The current PR\(^6\) was a member of the TNCM before declaring a conflict of interest in the last minute. It is presented that the mentioned representative of the PR did declare conflict of interest by the time when he had done a great deal of influence among other fellow members.\(^7\) All respondents in this study would wish to see TNCM members having a no go right for a PR or SR role.

**EPA Tool & Process**

*Tools*

There are two main Geneva EPA tools:

The excel tool is very comprehensive and is aligned to the eligibility requirements. The indicators on the tool are detailed enough to allow assessment to capture qualitative issues of CCM performance. It also has a dashboard which gives results on real time as well as highlighting areas to be included in the PIP.

The excel tool is highly detailed and this is not user friendly especially for a self-assessment. The required evidence of results is limiting to existence of documents but doesn't include process and application of practice.

The excel tool used independent of other data collection methods limits the assessment to a checklist existence of documents and policies and leaves out practice.

The qualitative questionnaire is also comprehensive enough capturing important performance areas, of CCM mandate and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the tool is very long and difficult to process in a one on one interview. Some of the questions can be collapsed to reduce the length of the tool.

Although the tool is comprehensive and very good, there is no direct link to the overall assessment that is captured in excel tool. Key question is how to integrate the tool into the overall assessment. The results need to be reflected as part of the assessment. Currently the assessment is heavily dependent on the excel tool which is a self-assessment and responses from the qualitative questionnaire are not reflected.

\(^6\) Save the Children Tanzania is the Principal Recipient (PR) of the Global Fund Grant (Grant no....)

\(^7\) All respondents in this study refer to the PR (Save the Children Tanzania: an ex-member of TNCM) selection process for the current Global Fund Grant to Tanzania
Analysis

Process

The EPA follows a self-assessment process, while this is best practice in overall it is highly susceptible process conducted in a focused group discussion environment, this is challenging for members of CCM who have less powers especially those from the non-state constituencies, often feels victimised expressing views not accepted by government counterpart.

Stakeholder interviews: Stakeholders interview generate critical information with an outsider perspective of the CCM. This is useful in providing additional information on CCMs that cannot be captured during the self-assessment. Nevertheless, this information is subject to consultant’s interpretation and there are risks of omission mainly because there is no direct link or guidelines on how to transmit the information into the overall assessment.

PIP Tool and Process

The PIP is directly linked to the excel tool and activities captured in the PIP are drawn from the assessment responses. With this regard, the PIP tool and process is excellent.

Areas for strengthening will include ensuring the PIP is shared with all stakeholders. This will allow effective monitoring of implementation of PIP activities. There is also need to cost the PIP activities and develop a budget to be managed by the CCM secretariat.
Findings

Finding 1: Inadequate capacity (financial and non-financial) among CSO and KAPs representatives and members of the oversight committee

Both members and non-members of the TNCM identified that CSO and KAPs representatives have inadequate financial capacity to convene constituency-consultative meetings. This has kept a number of invitees in these meetings limited to fifteen per constituency. Consequently, personal views/opinion are presented or limited scope of opinion from respective constituency. Constituency representatives further noted that the budget allocated for quarterly constituency consultative meetings (pre and post-meetings) is about $490 which is not enough. From that fact, it is recommended that the budget for quarterly constituency meeting (pre and post-meetings) is raised to at least $1,000. This will significantly increase engagement and participation in each specific constituency.

Financial constrains seem not only to affect participation in TNCM but also other core functions of the oversight committee such as upcountry field visit and fully implementation of the oversight plan. Also, with that level of budget inadequacy, the oversight’s ability to consult and provide feedback to the members is constrained. As result, the oversight committee fails to implement its annual oversight plan;

On the other hand, members of both TNCM and oversight committee demonstrate low technical capacity in multiple functions of their mandate. They actually show low knowledge and awareness of functions and processes of Global Fund and its procedures. Five out of seven respondents on face-to-face interviews reveal that CSO and KAP representatives have no meaningful participation and cannot influence decision.

With all these challenges, the performance of members of both TNCM and oversight committee has been not good enough hence bringing about many programmatic problems and financial queries. Also, the OIG Audit report assessed the oversight as non-compliant since there were several recurrent grant implementation failures which involved mismanagement of funds.

Finding 2: Under resourced TNCM Secretariat and its impact

Despite its good performance, the TNCM secretariat is under resourced in terms of financial and human resource. The secretariat has only two staff; the executive secretary and one office assistant who is an intern. In fact this overloads the team and can significantly affect the functionality of the secretariat. During the visit to the TNCM, the study team also observed that the secretariat lacks enough office space and furniture. It is therefore advised that both administrative and coordination budget is adequately increased to improve secretariat’s performance.

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8 The consultative meetings involve pre and post meetings which are convened quarterly prior to the TNCM meetings. They are meant for the purpose of gathering opinions and agenda (s) from members of the respective constituency and provide feedback

9 The amount of money allocated to cover conference package, transport costs for invitees, coordination costs, stationeries etc.

10 Regular access to the field could improve grant performance and work out most the audit queries that are repeatedly noted in consecutive past three years.

**Finding 3: Unequal country geographical representation**

Constituency representation at the TNCM badly suffers from Dar es Salaam syndrome; meaning that over 70% of all members is based in the capital city Dar es Salaam. This expresses high level of uneven country geographical representation.

As such, interventions are tailored in the view of Dar es Salaam based people. In reference to section (5), the voice of the majority is not heard and hence no plausible plans to address their challenges. Furthermore, findings show that some KP groups such as young girls and fisher folks are not represented.

This course rests on two major causes; (i) inadequate budget to invite upcountry interested individuals in the specific constituency election and (ii) poor coordination of the whole election process amongst constituencies. It is therefore important to do away with this kind of imbalances in order to achieve desired grant performance through full engagement and meaningful participation.
Recommendations

Priority Area 1: Increase financial and human resources at the TNCM secretariat

Despite the fact that the TNCM secretariat is under resourced, it is well aligned and takes on its roles with high level of professionalism. For the sake of improved performance, it is therefore recommended that the fully resourced with financial and human resources.

This will adequately improve coordination, visibility and performance in other related core functions of the secretariat. Also, this kind of support can be help in expediting the process of designing and launching a TNCM website. Also, for smooth execution of its roles, the TNCM secretariat requires a spacious office space where small meetings with TNCM members, non-members and other relevant stakeholders who matter for the work of Global Fund and its grant can be held.

The members of TNCCM and/or consultant can take part in the recruitment process since they understand office needs in relation to qualifications of the prospected candidates. Feasibly, it would be wise to have all gaps addressed in the first quarter of implementation year 2017.

Priority Area 2: Strengthen induction and refresher program for newly elected members of both TNCM and oversight committee

It was learnt from TNCM members that they hadn't have training further to their constituency election. They only had one hour orientation which covered core functions of TNCM prior to the election process. In fact, this cannot suffice technical and knowledge needs regarding to Global Fund processes and TNCM core functions. As such, it is critical that the program is improved by increasing number of training days to at least five. For the sake of quality and sustainability, it is also important to have in place a comprehensive training manual and guidelines.

Importantly also, members of both TNCM and oversight committee should be subjected to continuous professional development exercise through regional and/or global exchange learning and other purposeful training tailored to meet capacity needs. The country team, EANNASO, AAI and a consultant can take lead in developing the above-mentioned training manuals and guidelines, pre-test them before application and deliver similar trainings.

As this can be scheduled later, it is however essential to address capacity gaps among current TNCM members who hadn't have full package of training on their core functions, Global Fund processes and procedures.

Priority Area 3: Review existing CoI policy and design country specific representation and consultation policy that will achieve equal country geographical representation:

The CoI policy requires amendments to include a special provision that will articulate a no go right for a GFATM Request for Application amongst members of both TNCM and/or oversight committee. Importantly also, there must
Recommendations

be a special directive regulating members’ representation between Dar es Salaam region and the rest of 30 regions of the country. It is recommended by respondents that at least 40% of representatives come from Dar es Salaam.\(^{12}\)

In line with this, the country team, EANNASO and a consultant develop key advocacy plan to influence the GF to adequately increase budget for constituency consultation and oversight work. This will improve pre-consultation, representation and oversight to the country implemented grants. As such, the meaningful engagement and participation being articulated in the New Funding Model will be attained.

Any Other Comments

Both members and non-members of the TNCM would wish to see the PR being explicitly local CSOs with local Tanzanian nationals forming board of directors and program staff. However, the role of capacity building by international organizations to the locals should not be ignored;

There has been misunderstanding between the government and CSOs which implement KP interventions. This is due to the fact that contrary to the programmatic description and KP interventions in the approved concept Note, the government doesn't support some the methodologies and interventions. Most areas of concern included, MSM, gay and FCSW interventions. From that background, it is very essential to bring about harmony and clarity on this matter;

There seem to be considerable qualification disparity among TNCM members which may require a review of entry qualifications for TNCM membership. This will improve the quality of representatives. However, the secretariat and the CCM hub must put in place a mechanism that will attract knowledgeable and skilled people into the TNCM and/or the oversight committee. This can be in form of material and/or financial incentives or any other form of motivation;

The findings show that about four members of the TNCM are not fully committed to performing their mandate. Two of these have never attended any TNCM meeting since when they got elected in their respective constituencies. It is therefore recommended that the mentioned members are immediately replaced. Also, the secretariat should design internal control mechanisms for performance management among members of both TNCM and oversight committee;

The secretariat requires IT support to expedite the process of designing and launching TNCM website through which basic information can be accessed.

\(^{12}\) Tanzania Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2012: National Household and population census: Dar es Salaam population (about 5 million people) form 10% the national population
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